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One of the striking features of transition from plan to market in CIS agriculture is the 
dramatic shift from the predominance of large corporate farms (kolkhozy and  sovkhozy, 
generally referred to as agricultural enterprises) to individual or family agriculture based on a 
spectrum of small farms. The individual sector, combining the traditional household plots and 
the new peasant farms that began to emerge after 1992, accounts for most of agricultural 
production and controls a large share of arable land. This is a dramatic change from the pre-
1990 period, when agricultural enterprises produced over 70% of GAO and controlled over 
90% of arable land.  
These changes of farm structure, while consistent with the dominant mode in market 
agricultures, clash with the traditional Soviet philosophy of economies of scale. They also 
clash with the inherited ideology that views small family farms as an undesirable and even 
damaging deviation from the capital-intensive, highly mechanized, and commercially oriented 
mainstream. We therefore witness an ongoing debate, both among CIS decision makers and 
within the academic community, as to the performance advantages of the two main 
organizational forms in agriculture – large corporate farms and small family farms.  
This continuing debate in effect ignores the well-known theoretical considerations that reveal 
clearly identifiable advantages of small family farms compared with large corporate farms. 
There is generally no evidence of economies of scale in primary agricultural production, 
while individual or family farms are easier to organize and operate than corporations. Family 
farms are free from labor monitoring costs and are not prone to agency problems, contrary to 
large corporate farms employing hired labor and run by outside managers. These factors 
highlight the importance of individual incentives for farm efficiency and account for the 
predominance of family farms in market economies, where a family farm is not necessarily a 
very small farm: the optimal farm size is determined in each particular case by the managerial 
capacity of the farmer, and it may be quite large for highly capable individuals.  
In this article we assemble evidence that, in our opinion, shows that individualization of 
agriculture is associated with the post-transition recovery in CIS and that small family farms 
outperform the large enterprises, at least by measures of land productivity. The evidence is 
presented here for the five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Previously similar results have been obtained for the Trans-
Caucasian states (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and to a certain extent also for the 
European countries of the CIS.  
                                                
1 This paper is a part of an ongoing study of the economic effects of land reform in Central Asia sponsored by 
FAO’s Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia in Budapest. All data are from official statistical yearbooks 
of the countries covered, including the CIS statistical database published in Moscow by the Statistical 
Department of the CIS.   2 
The Four Phases of Agricultural Development 
 
Central Asia, as a region, has gone through three phases of agricultural development during 
the last 45 years (Figure 1). The first phase can be characterized as the Soviet growth period, 
which was sustained by the stable supportive environment that characterized the post-Stalin attitude 
toward agriculture in the USSR. The Soviet growth phase extended until 1990, when the GAO 
index had risen to 225% of its level in 1980. The second phase is the transition collapse 
triggered by the dismantling of the traditional Soviet system and the disruption of all support 
services in agriculture. The GAO index dropped by almost 40% between 1990 and 1998, 
bottoming out in 1998 at about the level of 1975. The third phase is the recovery phase 
characterized by renewed agricultural growth after 1998, when the cumulative effect of 











Figure 1. Long-term agricultural 
development in Central Asia: GAO 
index 1965-2007.  
 
The Turnaround Point 
Figure 2 superimposes the agricultural growth curves for two other regions: Trans-Caucasus 
and the European CIS. The three phases of long-term agricultural development – growth, 
collapse, and recovery – are clearly visible in each regional curve. The notable difference is 
the shift of the point where recovery starts: as early as 1993 in Trans-Caucasus, 1998 in 









Figure 2. Regional GAO growth 
1965-2007: averages for three regional 
groupings of CIS countries.  
 
There is a traceable link between the beginning of recovery and the implementation of 
significant farm structure reforms. In Trans-Caucasus recovery started in 1993, precisely 
when two of the three Trans-Caucasian countries – Armenia and Georgia – had made resolute 
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efforts to dismantle collective agriculture and distribute land to individual farms at the very 
beginning of transition. The rate of recovery in Trans-Caucasus subsequently accelerated after 
1996, when Azerbaijan had adopted a farm individualization policy as part of Aliyev’s 
reforms: this acceleration is clearly visible in the steeper slope of the Trans-Caucasus curve in 
Figure 2 from 1997 onward. It is sometimes argued that Azerbaijan’s agricultural success 
since 1996 is simply a reflection of the booming oil revenues that fuel the overall economic 
growth. Armenia and Georgia do not have any oil revenues, and yet the starting point for 
agricultural recovery in these countries is clearly linked with the implementation of land 
individualization reforms. In the European CIS, recovery began around 1999, as two of the 
four countries – Ukraine and Moldova – began moving in earnest toward distribution of land 
plots to holders of paper land shares. The extent of the recovery in this group is moderate, 
because two other countries – Russia and Belarus – have not done much by way of actual land 
reform.  















Figure 3. Turnaround points for Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan,  Turkmenistan, Tajikistan (1998 
turnaround), Kyrgyzstan (1995), and Uzbekistan (1996). 
The recovery in Central Asia as a region began in 1998 (see Figure 2), by which time all five 
countries had moved toward implementing various reform measures in various ways. Looking 
at the detailed country patterns (Figure 3), we note that in three of the five cases – 















































Uzb  4 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – the actual turnaround from decline to recovery 
indeed came in 1998. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, the turnaround came 
earlier (1995 and 1996, respectively), but the advancecontribution of these two countries to 
overall recovery is masked in the average regional curve by the majority with 1998 
turnaround.  
 
Individualization of Central Asian Agriculture 
During the Soviet era, the farming structure in all the former republics of the USSR was 
dominated by large agricultural enterprises – collective and state farms, which coexisted with 
small household plots cultivated by the rural population – the traditional “private” sector of 
Soviet agriculture. The large enterprises produced most of the commercially traded output, 
while the household plots were largely subsistence oriented and sold only their surplus output 
that remained after satisfying the family’s needs for food.  
Two changes began to be implemented in this dual farming structure already in the early 
1990s: the household plots were substantial enlarged by additional land allocations from the 
state and a totally new organizational form – the “peasant farm” – emerged after 1992. While 
household plots were typically managed on a part time basis by workers of agricultural 
enterprises, rural administrative employees, or pensioners and had many symbiotic links with 
the local agricultural enterprise, peasant farms were created as independent entities outside the 
existing collectivist framework. They were substantially larger than the household plots 
(although much smaller than the agricultural enterprises) and, unlike household plots, they 
had a clear commercial orientation. As a result, the dual farming structure that prevailed 
during the Soviet period evolved into a three-component structure: a “private” or individual 
sector that now consisted of both household plots and peasant farms and the corporate 
enterprise sector inherited from the Soviet era. We refer to this process involving enlargement 
of household plots and creation of new peasant farms as “conventional” land 
individualization.  
It is important to note that individualization of land tenure is different from privatization of 
legal ownership of land. First, land can be privatized only in countries that legally recognize 
private ownership of agricultural land, i.e., Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan all land remains state owned and it is transferred to farmers in use rights. 
Turkmenistan formally recognizes private land ownership (with severe transferability 
restrictions), but virtually all land in the country is owned by the state and is given to farmers 
in use rights, as in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where no private land ownership is recognized. 
Second, new landowners may decide not to farm their privatized land individually and instead 
transfer it to others for farming through various lease or rental arrangements. This is the 
experience in many Central and Eastern European countries, where land privatization often 
created absentee landowners with more lucrative jobs in the city, or alternatively, in countries 
such as Moldova or Romania, where the new landowners, while residing in rural areas and 
relying mainly on income from agriculture, felt unprepared to assume the risks of individual 
farming and therefore entrusted their land to others under contract. Private land owners and 
individual farmers are therefore two different groups of people with only partial overlap.  
Since land resources in each country are inherently limited, the enlargement of household 
plots and the creation of new peasant farms have necessarily come at the expense of the 
agricultural enterprises, which lost much of their land to the individual sector. Figure 4 
illustrates the shift of arable land from corporate farms (enterprises) to the individual sector 
(household plots and peasant farms) in four of the five Central Asian states, which adhered to   5 
the process of reform as described above. In all four countries we witness substantial 
expansion of the individual sector and the corporate farms have clearly lost their exclusively 
dominant position. Kazakhstan is somewhat of an outlier in three respects: first, this is the 
only country that suffered from significant shrinkage of arable land inventories through 
abandonment; second, the household sector in Kazakhstan controls a much smaller proportion 
of land than in the other countries; and third, the corporate sector continues to retain a much 
greater share of arable land than in the other countries. Still, the share of corporate farms in 
arable land in Kazakhstan went down from virtually 100% in 1990-91 to about 60% in 2007. 
 
Uzb                Taj 
Kyr                Kaz 
Figure 4. Shift of arable land from agricultural enterprises to individual farms 1991-2007 (countries with 
“conventional” individualization: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan). 
Alongside with conventional individualization of land tenure in the four countries, 
Turkmenistan also achieved remarkable changes of farm structure despite its image as a 
“slow” reformer. In fact, Turkmenistan allowed farm structure to shift in 1998 from collective 
form of organization to family leaseholding. Leaseholding is basically a form of individual 
farming (with many restrictions), although land in family leasehold is not counted as 
individual tenure in official statistics and is not reflected as an advance in land reform in the 
formal land reform indexes published by international organizations. Turkmenistan is the only 
country in the region where individual agriculture is mainly leasehold-based and the bulk of 
land in individual land tenure is not reported in official statistics. In Figure 5, the left-hand 
panel reflects the official land statistics, which show very little individualization since 1990. 
The right-hand panel uses indirect land-use data to separate out the component of arable land 
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cultivated in family leaseholds: with this adjustment most of the arable land is seen to be in 
individual use since 1998.  
Tur – official              Tur – de facto 
 
Figure 5. Individualization through leaseholding in Turkmenistan. Left panel: farm structure based on official 
statistics; right panel:  
The shift of the main productive resource – arable land – from enterprises to the individual 
sector has resulted in a significant increase in the share of individual farms in agricultural 
production. At the end of the Soviet era individual farms (the traditional household plots at 
that time) contributed one-third of Gross Agricultural Output (GAO) in Central Asia and 
agricultural enterprises produced the remaining two-thirds; in 2007, individual farms 
(household plots and peasant farms combined) contribute 88% of GAO and the share of the 
enterprises had shrunk to 12%. Table 1 summarizes the data on the dramatic shift of land and 
production to the individual sector between 1990 and 2007 in the Central Asian states. For 
comparison it shows Azerbaijan as a representative of the Trans-Caucasus region, where 
individualization has been comparable to that in Central Asia, and also Russia and Ukraine, 
where individualization lags far behind both Central Asia and Trans-Caucasus. 
Table 1. Changing role of individual farms 1991-2007 
Share of arable land in individual use, %  Share of GAO from individual farms, %   
1991   2007   1991   2007  
Kaz   1   38   32   73  
Kyr   3   73   44   97  
Taj   7   81   22   86  
Tur   5   87      
Uzb   8   75   33   94  
Average  5   71   33   88  
Azerbaijan  4  78  35  95 
Russia  2   18   24   57  
Ukraine  7   37   27   64  
 
There are certain differences in the composition of individual sector GAO across countries 
(Figure 6). Kyrgyzstan stands out as the country where peasant farms contribute the largest 
share of GAO. In Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan the role of the household plots in 
production is much more prominent. The share of agricultural enterprises in GAO has 
collapsed across the entire region, but in Kazakhstan they retain a relatively large share of 
production (although also much smaller than the share of the individual sector). The relatively 
large share of production contributed by corporate farms in Kazakhstan is consistent with 
their relatively large share in arable land (see Figure 4). 
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Kyr                Taj 
 
Uzb                Kaz 
Figure 6.  Structure of GAO by farm type 1991-2007. 
Legend: HH – households, PF – peasant farms, Ent – agricultural enterprises. 
 
The Turnaround Point and Individualization 
 
The turnaround point in all Central Asian countries is characterized by a significant jump of 
the share of arable land in individual cultivation (Table 2). This share increased abruptly by a 
factor of between 1.6 and 2.0 in just two years: the year before the turnaround point (t-1) and 
the year after the turnaround point (t+1).
2 These abrupt increases in the share of individual 
land tenure were triggered by identifiable pieces of legislation adopted near the turnaround 
point (Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Change in the share of arable land in individual use before and after the turnaround point 
Arable land in individual use, %    Turnaround  
year, t  Year t-1  Year t+1  Jump (t+1)/(t-1) 
Kaz   1998  16  27  1.69 
Kyr    1995  26  49  1.88 
Taj   1998  16  32  2.00 
Uzb   1996  12  19  1.58 
Tur (incl. leaseholds)  1998  54  84  1.56 
 
                                                
2 In Azerbaijan the shift of arable land resources on two sides of the turnaround point (1997) has been even more 
dramatic: the share of arable land in individual use went up from 6% in 1996 to 82% in 1998, a 14-fold increase.  
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Table 3. Significant land-reform legislation passed near the turnaround point 
  Turnaround  
year 
Date of significant 
land reform legislation 
Name of legislation 
Kaz  1998  8.1997 
3.1998 
Land shares 
Peasant farms law  
Taj   1998  6.1996 
6.1998  
Enterprise reorganization 
Right to land use  
Tur   1998  12.1996 
1.1997  
Land allocation to individuals 
Improving farm incentives  
Kyr   1995  2.1994 
8.1994 
Measures for deepening land and agrarian reform  
Procedures for implementation of land reform; 
reorganization of ag enterprises; land share 
determination  
Uzb   1996  8.1994  Measures for economic encouragement of the 
development of agriculture  
The significant change of individual land tenure around the turnaround point and the 
existence of identifiable legal acts associated with the turnaround year provide strong 
evidence of a link between individualization of agriculture and agricultural recovery. Further 
evidence is provided by the comparison of individualization in Central Asia, on the one hand, 
and Russia and Ukraine, on the other (Table 1). Two facts are apparent for Russia and 
Ukraine. First, agriculture in Russia and Ukraine is much less individualized than in Central 
Asia (Table 1). Second, agricultural recovery in Russia and Ukraine after the turnaround 
point in 1999 was much more sluggish than in Central Asia or Trans-Caucasus (Figure 2). In 
our view, the sluggish recovery in Russia and Ukraine is the result of indecisive and half-
hearted individualization attempts: these two large countries continue to maintain policies that 
give preference to large corporate farms rather than small family farms. By contrast, the 
robust recovery in both Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia is associated with decisive land 
individualization policies in these regions.  
Figure 7. GAO growth rate since turnaround increases with the increase of the average share of arable land in 
individual farms: Central Asia and other CIS countries. 
Finally, a simple analysis for Central Asia and other CIS countries shows that the annual 
growth rate achieved after the turnaround year is positively associated with the share of arable 
land in individual farms (Figure 7; R
2=0.45, the regression coefficient is significant at 5%). In 
other words, post-turnaround growth is faster in countries that have more land in individual 
use.   9 
Productivity of Individual Farms 
Central Asia enjoys robust agricultural growth despite the steady decline of corporate farms 
(enterprises) and their shrinking share of both land and production. This implies that recovery 
in agriculture is driven entirely by growth in the individual sector of household plots and 
peasant farms, while the formerly dominant sector of agricultural enterprises continues its 
decline. In fact, individual farms are the engine of recovery because they achieve higher 
productivity than enterprises.  
 
A rough and easy way to assess the productivity of farms of different types is by comparing 
their share in production to their share in arable land. In Central Asia, the individual sector – 
household  plots  and  peasant  farms  combined  –  contributes  88%  of  GAO  (the  value  of 
agricultural output) on just 71% of arable land (see Table 1). This disparity between the share 
of individual farms in output and land is a persistent phenomenon that was observed also in 
the Soviet period, when household plots – the only type of family farm in existence at that 
time – produced 45% of GAO on just 2% of land. The disparity between shares of production 
and land provides a measure of relative productivity: the entire agricultural sector  produces 
100% of GAO on 100% of land with relative productivity of 1; relative productivities higher 
than 1 (when the share of output is greater than the share of land) are indicative of land being 
used more efficiently than the average for the entire sector, while relative productivities less 
than 1 (when the share of output is less than the share of land) suggest that land is being used 
less efficiently than the sectoral average.  
 
Figure 8. Relative productivity of land by farm type in Central Asia, 2006-2007. 
 
Estimates  of  relative  efficiency  of  land  utilization  for  farms  of  the  three  main  types  – 
agricultural enterprises, peasant farms, and household plots – present a clear ranking for the 
Central  Asian  countries  (Figure  8):  the  efficiency  of  land  utilization  rises  sharply  from 
enterprises (the lowest) to household plots (the highest). Peasant farms generally fall in the 
middle  between  enterprises  and  household  plots  (except  in  Tajikistan).  The  low  relative 
productivity of agricultural enterprises suggests that they are very inefficient in the utilization 
of the large land resources that they continue to control: more efficient farming could generate 
substantially greater output from the available arable land and thus contribute more to rural 
incomes and poverty alleviation. 
 
Alongside relative productivities of land utilization, we can also calculate the absolute land 
productivity for different farm types as the value of crop production per hectare of sown land. 
Compressed vertical scale for Kazakhstan (actual value HH=51)
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So far such calculations have been carried out for three countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan.  The  pattern  for  Kyrgyzstan  is  the  closest  to  our  theoretical  expectations: 
individual farms in Kyrgyzstan are observed to achieve consistently higher levels of land 
productivity  than  agricultural  enterprises  (Figure  9).  Among  the  two  components  of  the 
individual  sector,  the  traditional  small  household  plots  outperform  the  newly  emergent 
peasant  farms.  Productivity  calculations  in  absolute  values  reveal  the  same  ranking  for 
Kyrgyzstan as relative productivity: efficiency of land use rises from enterprises to peasant 
farms and finally to household plots. This efficiency ranking provides strong evidence in 
support of land reform, which has been responsible for the strengthening of the relatively 













Figure 9. Kyrgyzstan: land productivity by 
farm type 1999-2007 (based on value of crop 



























Figure 10. Land productivity by farm type 
in Tajikistan (1991-2007, top panel) and 
Uzbekistan (1995-2006, bottom panel). 
Based on value of crop production in 
constant prices. 
 
The  diagrams  for  Tajikistan  and 
Uzbekistan also demonstrate the case for land reform and its potential yield improving effects. 
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Figure 10 shows the huge differences in productivity of land between household plots on one 
side  and  enterprises  and  peasant  farms  on  the  other.  Household  plots  –  the  undisputed 
individual  farms  in  all  CIS  countries  –  consistently  achieve  much  higher  levels  of  land 
productivity: agricultural land in household plots is utilized 20 to 50 times more productively 
than  in  farms  of  other  types.  Further  redistribution  of  land  to  household  plots  could 
substantially increase average productivity in agriculture, thus leading to a large increase in 
agricultural  production.  The  productivity  results  for  peasant  farms  are  puzzling  in  our 
theoretical framework: there are no statistically significant performance advantages to family-
run peasant farms compared with manager-run enterprises in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
In Tajikistan, this puzzling result may stem from the fact that at least one-third of the peasant 
farms in this country are not really individual farms at all: they are collective dehkan farms 
(partnerships) created in the process of reorganization of traditional farm enterprises and their 
incentives  are  closer  to  those  of  corporate  farms  than  individual  farms.  Many  of  these 
collective dehkan farms were only cosmetically reorganized and the management structures 
have remained unchanged. Under these circumstances we should not be surprised that the 
productivity of peasant farms in Tajikistan, taken as a heterogeneous group, is not different 
from that of the farm enterprises they succeeded. Future analytical efforts should attempt to 
separate  the  performance  of  individual  dehkan  farms  from  collective  dehkan  farms  in 
Tajikistan. 
 
More generally we can conjecture that the  newly emergent peasant farms are still in the 
learning stage, trying to adapt to the market environment and to optimize their operations. The 
infrastructure and support services in all CIS countries are grossly inadequate in general and 
are  ill-adapted to  serving mid-sized family  farms in  particular. Inadequate marketing  and 
supply channels, as well as almost total lack of extension and advice services, constitute a 
serious obstacle to efficient operation of new peasant farms and prevent them from realizing 
the inherent advantages of their individual form of organization. It is conjectured that the 
performance of peasant farms will rise in line with theoretical expectations when the market 
environment improves.   
Conclusion 
 
Recovery of agricultural growth is associated with individualization of farming. Because of 
the higher productivity of family farms, and especially household plots, the individualization 
of agriculture has led to significant recovery of agricultural production in Central Asia. The 
steep decline in GAO that characterized the early years of transition (1990-1994) changed to 
robust  growth  in  the  second  half  of  the  1990s.  Following  the  shift  to  more  productive 
individual agriculture GAO had recovered to the 1990 Soviet-era peak by 2004-2005 
 
Small  family  farms  have  become  the  backbone  of  the  post-transition  farming  structure, 
replacing the agricultural enterprises that dominated during the Soviet era. A new farming 
structure requires a new market infrastructure for farm services, including channels for sale of 
products and delivery of farm inputs, as well as provision of extension, training, and advice 
services for the small private farmers. Government policies should be designed to take these 
new factors into consideration. 
 
The empirical results of this paper have important implications for the ongoing policy debate 
between the supporters of large corporate farms, who continue to advocate economies of 
scale, and the supporters of smaller family farms, who emphasize the advantages of individual   12 
incentives. This debate is not limited to Central Asia, and it is relevant also for the rest of the 
CIS.  The  results  will  hopefully  inform  this  ongoing  debate and  incrementally  add  to  the 
growing body of  evidence  that highlights the performance advantages of family  farms in 
transition countries.  
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